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  Turn	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Abstract	  This	  article	  has	  three	  main	   interconnected	  aims.	  First,	   I	   illustrate	  the	  historiographical	  conceptions	   of	   three	   early	   analytic	   philosophers:	   Frege,	   Russell	   and	   Wittgenstein.	  Second,	   I	   consider	   some	  of	   the	  historiographical	   debates	   that	  have	  been	  generated	  by	  the	  recent	  historical	  turn	  in	  analytic	  philosophy,	  looking	  at	  the	  work	  of	  Scott	  Soames	  and	  Hans-­‐‑Johann	  Glock,	   in	  particular.	  Third,	   I	  discuss	  Arthur	  Danto’s	  Analytic	  Philosophy	  of	  
History,	   published	   50	   years	   ago,	   and	   argue	   for	   a	   reinvigorated	   analytic	   philosophy	   of	  history.	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1	  Introduction	  Analytic	   philosophy	   is	   widely	   regarded	   as	   ahistoricist	   in	   methodology,	   and	  indeed,	   even	   as	   anti-­‐‑historicist.	   Certainly,	   if	   we	   consider	   the	   official	  pronouncements	  of	  some	  of	  the	  leading	  figures	  of	  analytic	  philosophy,	  especially	  in	   its	   early	   phase,	   then	   one	   can	   easily	   come	   away	   with	   the	   impression	   that	  ‘historical’	  understanding	  and	  approaches	  are	  deemed	  of	   limited	  significance	  in	  philosophy.	   Yet	   even	   the	  most	   supposedly	   ahistoricist	   of	   analytic	   philosophers	  make	  use	  of	  history	  of	  philosophy	  in	  their	  work,	  and	  the	  question	  is	  not	  so	  much	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why	  they	  do	  not	  use	  history	  of	  philosophy	  as	  rather	  how	  and	  why	  they	  use	  it	  as	  they	  do.1	  Historiographical	  conceptions	  and	  methods	  –	  however	  crude	  they	  may	  be	  –	  are	  not	  absent	  in	  analytic	  philosophy,	  in	  other	  words,	  but	  are	  presupposed	  and	  operate	  implicitly	  in	  various	  ways.	  The	  first	  aim	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  to	  illustrate	  this	  by	   looking	  briefly	  at	   the	  methodologies	  of	  three	  of	  the	  founders	  of	  analytic	  philosophy:	  Frege	  (§2),	  Russell	  (§3),	  and	  Wittgenstein	  (§4).	  	   Since	   the	   early	   1990s	   there	   has	   been	   a	   movement	   within	   analytic	  philosophy	  to	  take	  history	  of	  philosophy	  more	  seriously,	  and	  especially	  its	  own	  history.	   The	   reasons	   for	   this	   are	   complex,	   but	   one	   main	   reason	   has	   been	   the	  growing	   sense	   of	   the	   distance	   between	   the	   concerns	   and	   projects	   of	   analytic	  philosophers	  today	  and	  those	  of	  its	  founders	  now	  more	  than	  a	  century	  ago.	  I	  say	  something	  about	   the	  historical	   turn	   that	  has	   taken	  place	   in	  analytic	  philosophy	  (§5),	   before	   looking	   at	   some	   of	   the	   debates	   it	   has	   generated	   about	   the	  relationship	  between	  philosophy	  and	  history	  of	  philosophy.	  In	  particular,	  I	  take	  the	   example	  of	   Scott	   Soames’	   2003	  work	  on	   the	  history	  of	   analytic	   philosophy	  (§6)	  and	  discuss	  Hans-­‐‑Johann	  Glock’s	  account	  of	  forms	  of	  historicism	  (§7).	  This,	  then,	   is	  the	  second	  aim	  of	  this	  paper:	  to	  elucidate	  the	  historical	  turn	  in	  analytic	  philosophy	  and	  consider	  some	  of	  the	  debates	  that	  this	  has	  inspired.	  	   In	  the	  final	  part	  of	  the	  paper	  I	  turn	  to	  Arthur	  Danto’s	  Analytic	  Philosophy	  
of	  History,	  which	  was	  published	  in	  1965.	  I	  outline	  its	  main	  ideas	  (§8)	  and	  show	  how	  they	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  points	  made	  earlier	  in	  the	  paper	  (§9).	  I	  conclude	  with	   a	   plea	   for	   a	   reinvigorated	   analytic	   philosophy	   of	   history	   (§10).	   The	   third	  aim	   of	   the	   paper,	   then,	   is	   to	   revisit	   Danto’s	   work	   and	   bring	   it	   back	   into	   the	  debates	   about	   historiography	   inspired	   by	   the	   historical	   turn	   in	   analytic	  philosophy.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The term ‘history’ is used in three main senses. It can mean a (relevant) series of past events, a 
(relevant) account of such a series, or the discipline of writing such accounts. Context usually makes 
clear which sense is intended. Generally, though, I shall use it in the first sense with the definite article, 
as in speaking of ‘the history of philosophy’ to denote philosophy’s actual past, in the second sense 
with either the indefinite or no article, as in speaking of ‘writing a history of philosophy’, and in the 
third sense with no article, as in speaking of ‘doing history of philosophy’. Sometimes both the second 
and third senses may be involved, as in speaking of ‘using history of philosophy’, but no confusion 
need result. Where unclarity might arise, I shall add an appropriate qualification in parentheses. 
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2	  Frege	  and	  the	  role	  of	  historical	  elucidation	  Gottlob	  Frege	  (1848–1925)	  is	  now	  generally	  recognized	  as	  one	  of	  the	  founders	  of	  analytic	  philosophy.	  His	  main	  project	  was	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  logicist	  thesis	  that	  arithmetic	   could	   be	   reduced	   to	   logic,	   and	   this	   required	   the	   development	   of	  logical	   theory	   for	   which	   Frege	   is	   rightly	   accorded	   his	   place	   in	   the	   history	   of	  analytic	  philosophy.	  The	  new	  logical	  theory	  was	  introduced	  in	  Frege’s	  first	  book,	  
Begriffsschrift,	  published	  in	  1879.	  It	  received	  poor	  reviews,	  however,	  and	  Frege	  was	  encouraged	   to	  present	  his	   ideas	   informally	  before	   seeking	   to	  demonstrate	  the	   logicist	   thesis	   formally.	   The	   result	   was	   The	   Foundations	   of	   Arithmetic,	   his	  second	  book,	  which	  appeared	  in	  1884.	  What	  is	  significant	  about	  this	  book	  is	  that	  the	   first	   half	   is	   devoted	   to	   an	   examination	   and	   critique	   of	   previous	   views	   of	  number	  in	  the	  history	  of	  mathematics	  and	  philosophy	  –	  among	  others,	  those	  of	  Euclid,	   Kant,	   Leibniz,	   Mill,	   Newton,	   Schröder,	   Locke,	   Berkeley,	   Hobbes,	   Hume,	  and	  Descartes.	  Frege	  may	  have	  used	  a	  collection	  as	  his	  source	  for	  the	  works	  he	  cites	   (Baumann	   1868),	   but	   he	   clearly	   saw	   the	   need	   to	   engage	   with	   previous	  views	  in	  order	  to	  motivate	  his	  own.	  	   In	  his	  own	  philosophical	  writings,	  Frege	  came	  to	  stress	  the	  role	  of	  what	  he	  called	   ‘elucidation’	   (‘Erläuterung’).	   Not	   everything	   can	   be	   defined,	   at	   least	  without	  circularity;	   so	  something	  else	   is	  needed	   to	  make	  clear	   the	  sense	  of	   the	  most	  basic	  terms,	  such	  as	  –	  in	  Frege’s	  case	  –	  ‘function’,	  ‘object’,	  and	  ‘truth-­‐‑value’.	  This	   is	   where	   elucidation	   comes	   in:	   terms	   are	   explained	   by	   using	   them	   in	  context,	   gesturing	  at	   their	   sense	  and	   relying	  on	  a	   “meeting	  of	  minds”,	   as	  Frege	  put	   it	  (1914,	  p.	  224/1997,	  p.	  313).	  Frege’s	  three	  most	   famous	  essays,	   ‘Function	  and	   Concept’,	   ‘On	   Sense	   and	   Reference’,	   and	   ‘On	   Concept	   and	   Object’,	   all	  published	   in	   the	   early	   1890s,	   should	   be	   seen	   as	   essentially	   elucidatory	   in	  precisely	  this	  way:	  they	  are	  intended	  to	  make	  clear	  the	  sense	  of	  the	  key	  terms	  of	  Frege’s	   philosophy,	   without	   which	   his	   own	   logicist	   project	   would	   not	   be	  understood.	  	   For	  Frege,	  elucidation	  occurs	  only	  at	  the	  pre-­‐‑theoretical	  stage,	  preparing	  the	   conceptual	   building-­‐‑blocks	   for	   theory-­‐‑construction.	   But	   this	   does	   not	  diminish	  its	  importance,	  for	  without	  clarity	  about	  its	  most	  basic	  terms,	  no	  theory	  will	  be	  convincing.	  If	  we	  bear	  in	  mind	  the	  advice	  that	  Frege	  heeded	  in	  writing	  the	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Foundations,	   then	  we	  can	  see	   that	  elucidation	  will	   inevitably	  have	  an	  historical	  dimension.	   For	   the	   most	   basic	   terms	   one	   uses	   will	   need	   to	   be	   explained	   by	  clarifying	  their	  relation	  to	  any	  similar	  terms	  used	  by	  previous	  thinkers.	   Indeed,	  Frege	  himself	  pointed	  out	   that	  he	  was	  using	   terms	  such	  as	   ‘function’,	   ‘concept’,	  and	  ‘object’	  in	  slightly	  different	  senses	  to	  those	  that	  the	  terms	  had	  had	  in	  earlier	  uses.	   To	   capture	   this,	   I	   have	   suggested	   that	   we	   talk	   of	   ‘historical	   elucidation’	  (Beaney	   2006a).	   The	   articulation	   of	   any	   philosophical	   theory	   or	   view	   requires	  fixing	  the	  senses	  of	  key	  terms,	  and	  given	  the	  disputes	  that	  there	  have	  been	  in	  the	  history	   of	   philosophy	   about	   the	   senses	   of	   key	   philosophical	   terms,	   part	   of	   the	  elucidation	   required	   will	   involve	   distinguishing	   the	   senses	   intended	   from	   the	  senses	  that	  others	  have	  expressed	  in	  using	  the	  same	  or	  similar	  terms	  in	  the	  past.	  	   In	   his	   introduction	   to	   the	   Foundations,	   Frege	   had	   famously	   criticized	  ‘historical’	  investigations:	  
 
The historical mode of investigation, which seeks to trace the development of things 
from which to understand their nature, is certainly legitimate; but it also has its 
limitations. If everything were in continual flux and nothing remained fixed and 
eternal, then knowledge of the world would cease to be possible and everything would 
be thrown into confusion. We imagine, it seems, that concepts originate in the 
individual mind like leaves on a tree, and we suppose that their nature can be 
understood by investigating their origin and seeking to explain them psychologically 
through the working of the human mind. But this conception makes everything 
subjective, and taken to its logical conclusion, abolishes truth. What is called the 
history of concepts is really either a history of our knowledge of concepts or of the 
meanings of words. Often it is only through enormous intellectual work, which can last 
for hundreds of years, that knowledge of a concept in its purity is achieved, by peeling 
off the alien clothing that conceals it from the mind’s eye. (1884, p. VII/1997, p. 88) 	  	   Leaving	  aside	  the	  Platonist	  view	  of	  concepts	  that	  this	  passage	  suggests	  (in	  opposition	   to	   a	   psychologistic	   view),	  we	   can	   agree	  with	   Frege	   that	   “enormous	  intellectual	  work”	  may	  be	  required	  to	  get	  clear	  about	  key	  philosophical	  concepts.	  What	  Frege	  describes	  as	  coming	  to	  know	  the	  relevant	  concept	  “in	  its	  purity”	  may	  be	  less	  controversially	  expressed	  as	  fixing	  the	  sense	  of	  a	  term	  as	  used	  in	  a	  given	  context	   (say,	   in	   pursuing	   a	   particular	   philosophical	   project).	   However	   it	   is	  described,	   though,	   ‘historical’	   investigations	  may	   actually	   be	   essential	   –	   not	   by	  explaining	  the	  concepts	  psychologically	  but	  by	  carefully	  charting	  the	  changes	  in	  senses	   of	   the	   relevant	   terms.	   Frege	   may	   not	   have	   done	   this	   himself	   in	   any	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systematic	   way,	   but	   he	   certainly	   recognized	   the	   need	   to	   locate	   his	   own	   views	  about	  arithmetic	  and	  logic	  in	  the	  historical	  space	  of	  previous	  views.	  	  
3	  Russell	  and	  the	  use	  of	  rational	  reconstruction	  Like	   Frege,	   Bertrand	   Russell	   (1872–1970)	   was	   a	   logicist,	   at	   least	   after	   his	  rebellion	   against	   British	   idealism	   at	   the	   turn	   of	   the	   twentieth	   century.	   In	  pursuing	   his	   own	   brand	   of	   logicism,	   however,	   his	   philosophical	   ideas	   went	  through	   many	   changes,	   from	   naïve	   realist	   views	   to	   complex	   combinations	   of	  reductionist,	   eliminativist,	   constructionist,	   and	   idealist	   views,	   inspired	   by	   his	  seminal	   theory	  of	  descriptions,	  which	  was	   first	   articulated	   in	  1905.	  This	   is	  not	  the	  place	  to	  offer	  even	  a	  sketch	  of	  these	  changes.	  What	  I	  want	  to	  focus	  on	  instead	  is	   the	   book	   he	   published	   in	   1900:	   A	   Critical	   Exposition	   of	   the	   Philosophy	   of	  
Leibniz.	   Exemplifying	   what	   is	   now	   called	   ‘rational	   reconstruction’,	   this	   can	   be	  regarded	  as	  the	  first	  work	  of	  ‘analytic’	  history	  of	  philosophy.2	  	   This	   book	   was	   written	   in	   the	   short	   period	   in	   which	   Russell	   rejected	  British	   idealism,	   and	   indeed,	   played	   a	   crucial	   role	   in	   that	   rejection.	   Russell	  attacked,	   in	  particular,	  what	  he	   called	   ‘the	  doctrine	  of	   internal	   relations’	   –	   that	  “Every	  relation	  is	  grounded	  in	  the	  natures	  of	  the	  related	  terms”,	  as	  he	  put	  it	  in	  his	  later	   account	   of	   his	   rebellion	   (1959,	   p.	   43).	   Russell	   saw	   this	   doctrine	   as	  characteristic	   of	   both	   British	   idealism	   (and	   especially	   Bradley’s	   monism)	   and	  Leibniz’s	  monadism,	  and	  he	  came	  to	  form	  his	  own	  realist	  views	  about	  relations	  in	   repudiating	   this	   doctrine.	   His	   book	   thus	   illustrates	   very	   well	   how	  philosophical	  positions	  are	  often	  developed	  by	   thinking	   through	  and	  criticizing	  the	  views	  of	  earlier	  philosophers.	  	   Russell	  proceeds	  by	  identifying	  five	  premises	  that	  he	  argues	  generate	  the	  whole	   of	   Leibniz’s	   philosophy	   but	   which	   are	   also	   responsible	   for	   the	  contradictions	   that	   undermine	   it.	   The	   first	   premise	   he	   formulates	   as	   the	   claim	  that	  every	  proposition	  has	  a	  subject	  and	  a	  predicate,	  and	  the	  second	  and	  third,	  in	  effect,	  imply	  what	  we	  can	  call	  Leibniz’s	  ‘containment	  principle’	  –	  that	  the	  truth	  of	  a	  proposition	  consists	  in	  the	  containment	  of	  the	  predicate	  concept	  in	  the	  subject	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 For an account of the development of the idea of rational reconstruction, see Beaney 2013d. 
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concept.3	   Russell	   argues	   that	   this	   commits	   Leibniz	   to	   denying	   the	   reality	   of	  relations,	   and	   criticizes	   him	   for	   this.	   According	   to	   Russell,	   the	   fundamental	  assumption	   that	   Leibniz	   shared	   with	   Bradley	   was	   that	   all	   propositions	   are	  reducible	   to	   the	   subject−predicate	   form,	   so	   that	   his	   criticism	   of	   Leibniz	   was	  equally	  an	  attack	  on	  Bradley.	  	   Russell’s	  critique	  of	  both	  Bradley	  and	  Leibniz	  is	  highly	  controversial:	  his	  interpretations	  are	  often	  uncharitable,	  to	  say	  the	  least.4	  But	  his	  book	  illustrates	  rational	   reconstruction	   very	  well.	   Russell	   reconstructs	   Leibniz’s	   philosophy	   by	  showing	  how	   it	   follows	   from	  as	   limited	  a	   set	  of	  premises	  as	  possible	  –	  not	   the	  whole	   of	   his	   philosophy,	   perhaps,	   but	   as	   many	   of	   Leibniz’s	   views	   as	   can	   be	  accommodated,	  bearing	  in	  mind	  that	  those	  views	  were	  scattered	  across	  a	  host	  of	  texts	   written	   at	   different	   times,	   as	   Russell	   points	   out	   (1900,	   pp.	   1–3).	   This	  conception	   of	   how	   to	   do	   history	   of	   philosophy,	   however,	   makes	   numerous	  assumptions	  itself.	  One	  assumption	  is	  that	  the	  axiomatic	  method,	  which	  may	  be	  appropriate	   in	   Euclidean	   geometry,	   can	   be	   successfully	   applied	   to	   philosophy.	  Russell	  reports	  that	  he	  had	  been	  inspired	  by	  Euclid	  from	  the	  age	  of	  eleven	  (1975,	  p.	   30),	   and	   even	   before	   his	   conversion	   to	   logicism,	   he	   had	   been	   concerned	   to	  identify	   the	   axioms	   of	   mathematics.5	   So	   he	   was	   clearly	   predisposed	   to	   the	  application	   of	   the	   Euclidean	  method	   to	   history	   of	   philosophy.	   To	   be	   sure,	   this	  method	  had	   influenced	  Spinoza,	   for	  example,	   in	  proceeding	  more	  geometrico	   in	  his	   Ethics.6	   But	   most	   philosophical	   views	   are	   not	   developed	   or	   expounded	   by	  following	   the	  axiomatic	  method,	   so	   its	  use	   in	  history	  of	  philosophy	  remains	  an	  assumption	  in	  need	  of	  support.	  	   Support	   is	   offered	  by	   the	  distinction	  between	  psychological	   genesis	   and	  logical	  justification,	  which	  is	  crucial	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  rational	  reconstruction.	  This	  is	  made	   clear	   by	   Russell	   himself	   in	   the	   preface	   to	   his	   book	   on	   Leibniz,	   in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Cf. Russell 1900, pp. 3–4. I ignore here the qualifications needed in the case of existential 
propositions. For Leibniz’s statement of this principle, see e.g. his letter to Arnauld of 14 July 1686 (tr. 
in Leibniz 1973, p. 62). 
4 For critical discussion of Russell’s attack on Bradley, see Candlish 2007; and for Russell’s critique of 
Leibniz, see Hunter 1993. 
5 See the papers in Russell 1990, Parts II–IV. 
6 In this regard it deserves noting that Russell had read Spinoza in the years immediately preceding his 
work on Leibniz. Cf. Blackwell 1985, pp. 48–51. 
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distinguishing	  a	  “mainly	  historical”	  from	  a	  “mainly	  philosophical”	  conception	  of	  history	   of	   philosophy.	   The	   former	   addresses	   questions	   of	   influence,	   growth,	  causes,	   and	   the	  wider	   context,	  while	   the	   latter	   seeks	   “to	  discover	  what	  are	   the	  great	  types	  of	  possible	  philosophies”	  and	  work	  out	  which	  is	  them	  is	  true.	  Russell	  elaborates	  on	  the	  latter	  as	  follows:	  	  in	   such	   enquiries	   the	   philosopher	   is	   no	   longer	   explained	   psychologically:	   he	   is	  examined	  as	  the	  advocate	  of	  what	  he	  holds	  to	  be	  a	  body	  of	  philosophic	  truth.	  By	  what	   process	   of	   development	   he	   came	   to	   this	   opinion,	   though	   in	   itself	   an	  important	  and	   interesting	  question,	   is	   logically	   irrelevant	   to	   the	   inquiry	  how	   far	  the	  opinion	  itself	  is	  correct	  (1900,	  p.	  xvi).	  	  Russell	   can	   be	   taken	   here	   to	   be	   speaking	   for	   many	   subsequent	   analytic	  philosophers.	  The	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  distinction	  between	  genesis	  and	  justification	  may	   be	   widely	   assumed	   today,	   but	   it	   is	   an	   assumption	   nevertheless	   and	   one	  whose	  own	  justification	  is	  not	  considered	  as	  much	  as	  it	  should.	  We	  will	  return	  to	  this	  in	  due	  course.	  	  
4	  Wittgenstein	  and	  the	  critique	  of	  language	  In	  his	  first	  work,	  the	  Tractatus	  Logico-­‐‑Philosophicus,	  Ludwig	  Wittgenstein	  (1889–1951)	   claimed	   that	   all	   philosophy	   is	   ‘critique	   of	   language’	   (4.0031).	   Most	  philosophical	  questions	  and	  propositions,	  he	  thought,	  were	  nonsense	  (unsinnig),	  arising	  from	  misunderstanding	  of	  the	  logic	  of	  our	  language	  (4.003),	  and	  the	  task	  of	  philosophy	  –	  properly	  pursued	  –	  was	   to	   show	   this	   (4.112,	  6.53).	   Supporting	  this	   view	  of	   the	   task	  of	  philosophy	  was	  a	   conception	  of	   language	  as	   already	   in	  ‘perfect	   logical	   order’	   (5.5563);	   the	   problem	  was	   just	   a	  mismatch	  between	   the	  surface	   grammatical	   form	   and	   the	   underlying	   logical	   form	   of	   ordinary	  propositions,	   a	  mismatch	   that	   he	   took	  Russell’s	   theory	   of	   descriptions	   to	   have	  well	   illustrated	   (4.0031).	   Logic	   was	   taken	   as	   a	   given:	   not	   only	   does	   its	   form	  mirror	   the	   form	   of	   the	   world	   (2.18),	   but	   it	   is	   a	   precondition	   for	   having	   any	  legitimate	  thought	  or	  experience	  at	  all	  (3.03,	  5.552).	  	   On	   this	  conception,	   it	   is	  hard	   to	  see	  what	  role	   ‘historical	  considerations’	  could	  play	  in	  philosophy.	  Wittgenstein	  does	  not	  mention	  such	  considerations	  at	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all,	   but	   he	   does	   talk	   about	   the	   danger	   of	   getting	   entangled	   in	   “inessential	  psychological	   investigations”	   (4.1121),	   and	   the	   same	   would	   presumably	   have	  been	   said	   about	   ‘historical’	   investigations.	   He	   undoubtedly	   shared	   Frege’s	   and	  Russell’s	   anti-­‐‑psychologism,	   and	   would	   have	   agreed	   that	   questions	   of	   genesis	  (whether	   historical	   or	   psychological)	   were	   irrelevant	   to	   issues	   of	   logical	  justification.	  	   In	   his	   later	   work,	   Wittgenstein	   rejected	   his	   earlier	   view	   of	   logic	   as	  somehow	   given	   a	   priori,	   but	   he	   continued	   to	   regard	   philosophy	   as	   ‘critique	   of	  language’.	  As	  he	  famously	  wrote	  in	  the	  Philosophical	  Investigations,	  “Philosophy	  is	   a	   battle	   against	   the	   bewitchment	   of	   our	   intelligence	   by	  means	   of	   language”	  (§109).	   He	   also	   continued	   to	   reject	   psychologism,	   but	   his	   view	   of	   ‘historical	  considerations’	  undergoes	  a	  subtle	  change.	  He	  does	  not	  ‘do’	  history	  of	  philosophy	  in	   any	   meaningful	   sense,	   though	   he	   occasionally	   takes	   the	   remarks	   of	   other	  philosophers	  –	  such	  as	  Plato	  or	  Frege	  or	  William	  James	  or	  Russell	  –	  as	  examples	  of	   propositions	   requiring	   philosophical	   critique.	   But	  Wittgenstein	   does	   talk	   at	  several	   points	   in	   his	   later	   writings	   of	   the	   ‘natural	   history’	   of	   mankind,	  understood	  as	  what	  provides	  the	  context	  or	  ‘form	  of	  life’	  in	  which	  our	  linguistic	  activities	   gain	   their	   sense	   (see	   e.g.	  PI,	   §§	  25,	   415).	   So	   an	  obvious	   suggestion	   is	  that	   history	   of	   philosophy	   can	   play	   a	   role	   in	   philosophy	   in	   making	   clear	   our	  forms	  of	  life.	  	   The	   most	   important	   passage	   in	   which	   Wittgenstein	   refers	   to	   ‘natural	  history’	  in	  the	  Philosophical	  Investigations	  is	  the	  following:	  	  	   If	   the	   formation	  of	   concepts	   can	  be	   explained	  by	   facts	   of	   nature,	   should	  we	  not	  be	  interested,	  not	  in	  grammar,	  but	  rather	  in	  that	  in	  nature	  which	  is	  the	  basis	  of	  grammar?—Our	  interest	  certainly	  includes	  the	  correspondence	  between	  concepts	  and	  very	  general	  facts	  of	  nature.	  (Such	  facts	  as	  mostly	  do	  not	  strike	  us	  because	  of	  their	  generality.)	  But	  our	  interest	  does	  not	  fall	  back	  upon	  these	  possible	  causes	  of	  the	   formation	   of	   concepts;	   we	   are	   not	   doing	   natural	   science;	   nor	   yet	   natural	  history—since	  we	  can	  also	  invent	  fictitious	  natural	  history	  for	  our	  purposes.	  	   I	  am	  not	  saying:	  if	  such-­‐‑and-­‐‑such	  facts	  of	  nature	  were	  different	  people	  would	  have	  different	  concepts	  (in	  the	  sense	  of	  a	  hypothesis).	  But	  if	  anyone	  believes	  that	  certain	   concepts	   are	   absolutely	   the	   correct	   ones,	   and	   that	   having	   different	   ones	  would	  mean	  not	  realizing	  something	  that	  we	  realize—then	  let	  him	  imagine	  certain	  very	   general	   facts	   of	   nature	   to	   be	   different	   from	  what	   we	   are	   used	   to,	   and	   the	  formation	   of	   concepts	   different	   from	   the	   usual	   ones	   will	   become	   intelligible	   to	  him.	  (II,	  xii,	  p.	  230)	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   Wittgenstein	  here	  stresses	  that	  he	  is	  not	  to	  be	  understood	  as	  doing	  either	  natural	   science	  or	  natural	  history,	   in	   the	   sense	  of	  offering	   ‘explanations’	   of	   the	  concepts	  we	  have	  or	  of	  their	  supposed	  ‘necessity’.	  One	  of	  his	  aims	  is	  to	  help	  us	  to	  appreciate	  the	  contingency	  of	  our	  linguistic	  practices	  –	  their	  basis	  in	  our	  forms	  of	  life	  –	  to	  defuse	  claims	  that	  we	  might	  be	  tempted	  to	  make	  about	  how	  things	  must	  be.	  This	  can	  be	  done	  by	  inventing	  ‘fictitious	  natural	  history’,	  as	  Wittgenstein	  puts	  it,	   or	  by	   imagining	   things	   to	  be	   very	  different	   from	  how	   they	   actually	   are	   –	  by	  ‘thought	   experiments’,	   as	  we	  might	  now	  describe	   it.	   In	  my	  view,	   however,	   this	  does	  not	  rule	  out	  the	  possibility	  of	  using	  science	  or	  history	  in	  such	  philosophical	  critique.	   Indeed,	   in	   many	   ways,	   taking	   real	   historical	   cases	   can	   be	   more	  convincing	  because	   it	   shows	  that	  human	  beings	  really	  did	  do	  different	   things	  –	  and	  have	   different	   concepts	   –	   in	   the	   past.	   Admittedly,	   such	   approaches	   can	   be	  taken	  to	  suggest	  that	  our	  beliefs	  are	  ‘explained’	  by	  seeing	  how	  they	  are	  ‘caused’	  by	  the	  relevant	  circumstances;	  but	  as	  long	  as	  we	  resist	  this	  kind	  of	  ‘explanation’,	  genuine	  as	  opposed	  to	  fictitious	  natural	  history	  can	  serve	  Wittgenstein’s	  task	  just	  as	  well.	  Perhaps,	   for	  certain	  purposes,	  we	  may	  need	  to	  imagine	  things	  radically	  different	  from	  how	  they	  have	  ever	  been	  in	  history	  in	  order	  to	  make	  us	  appreciate	  the	   contingency	   of	   some	   of	   our	  most	   fundamental	   activities;	   but	   this	   does	   not	  mean	  that	  natural	  science	  or	  natural	  history	  cannot	  be	  used	  at	  all.	  	  
5	  The	  historical	  turn	  in	  analytic	  philosophy	  If	   we	   consider	   the	   work	   of	   the	   three	   most	   important	   founders	   of	   analytic	  philosophy,	   Frege,	   Russell,	   and	   Wittgenstein,	   then	   there	   is	   good	   reason	   to	  characterize	   their	   own	   conceptions	   of	   philosophy	   as	   ahistoricist	   and	   even	   as	  anti-­‐‑historicist	   (in	   the	   way	   that	   they	   were	   anti-­‐‑psychologistic).	   The	   history	   of	  philosophy	   shows,	   however,	   that	   there	   is	   frequently	   a	   mismatch	   between	   a	  philosopher’s	  official	  methodological	  views	  and	  their	  actual	  practice.	  Both	  Frege	  and	  Russell	  used	  history	  of	  philosophy	  in	  their	  own	  work,	  and	  even	  Wittgenstein	  drew	  on	  the	  remarks	  of	  selected	  earlier	  philosophers	  in	  pursuing	  his	  project	  of	  philosophical	   critique.	   Something	   similar	   can	   be	   said	   of	   many	   subsequent	  analytic	  philosophers.	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   The	   ahistoricism	   of	   analytic	   philosophy	   was	   criticized	   from	   the	   very	  beginning.	  Ernst	  Cassirer,	  for	  example,	  in	  reviewing	  Russell’s	  book	  on	  Leibniz	  in	  an	   appendix	   to	  his	   own	  book	  on	  Leibniz,	   published	   in	  1902,	   attacked	  Russell’s	  fixation	  on	   identifying	  contradictions.	  Taking	  Leibniz’s	   conception	  of	   substance	  as	   his	   central	   example,	   Cassirer	   argued	   that	   it	   looked	   both	   backwards,	   in	  reworking	   the	   traditional	   Aristotelian	   conception,	   and	   forwards,	   in	   giving	   it	   a	  more	   dynamic	   character.	   He	   writes:	   “It	   would	   be	   entirely	   one-­‐‑sided	   and	  unhistorical	   to	   judge	   this	   opposition,	   on	   which,	   as	   it	   were,	   the	   whole	   inner	  tension	  of	  the	  system	  rests,	  as	  simply	  a	  contradiction”	  (1902,	  p.	  539).	  Sensitivity	  to	   ‘tensions’	   in	   philosophical	   thinking,	   which	   is	   often	   what	   drives	   its	  development,	   is	   characteristic	   of	   more	   historically-­‐‑minded	   philosophers;	   and	  Cassirer	  is	  quite	  right	  to	  stress	  its	  importance.	  	   As	   analytic	   philosophy	   itself	   developed	   –	   driven	   not	   only	   by	   its	   own	  internal	  tensions	  but	  also	  in	  responding	  to	  external	  criticisms	  and	  rival	  views	  –	  it	  began	  to	  be	  seen,	  by	  both	  its	  adherents	  and	  critics,	  as	  a	  philosophical	  tradition	  in	  its	   own	   right.	   This	   itself	   embodies	   historical	   self-­‐‑consciousness.	   Analytic	  philosophy	   –	   in	   its	   British	   variety	   –	   came	   to	   be	   seen	   as	   having	   originated	   in	  opposition	   to	   British	   idealism,	   which	   had	   been	   dominant	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	  nineteenth	  century.	  When	  it	  broadened	  to	  include	  logical	  empiricism,	  it	  was	  seen	  as	  opposed	  to	  ‘continental’	  forms	  of	  idealism,	  more	  generally,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  other	  European	   traditions,	   such	   as	   neo-­‐‑Kantianism,	   hermeneutics,	   and	  phenomenology.	   The	   whole	   self-­‐‑identity	   of	   analytic	   philosophy,	   then,	   has	   an	  essential	   historical	   dimension:	   it	   is	   partly	   individuated	   by	   its	   relations	   in	  historical	  space	  and	  time.	  	   Significantly,	   it	   was	   not	   until	   the	   1930s	   that	   the	   terms	   ‘analytic	  philosopher’	   and	   ‘analytic	  philosophy’	  were	  used	   in	  anything	   like	   their	   current	  senses.	   John	   Wisdom	   was	   the	   first	   to	   use	   ‘analytic	   philosopher’	   in	   his	  
Interpretation	   and	  Analysis	   of	   1931,	   and	  R.	  G.	   Collingwood	  was	   the	   first	   to	   use	  ‘analytic	  philosophy’	   in	  his	  Essay	  on	  Philosophical	  Method	  of	  1933.	   In	   the	   latter	  case,	   what	   deserves	   note	   is	   that	   it	   was	   used	   in	   criticizing	   analytic	   philosophy,	  further	   illustrating	   how	   terms	   are	   introduced	   and	   catch	   on	   in	   establishing	  oppositions	   to	   rival	   views.	   This	   was	   especially	   marked	   when	   the	   term	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‘continental	  philosophy’	  was	  introduced	  in	  1958	  by	  Gilbert	  Ryle	  at	  a	  conference	  in	   France	   that	   had	   sought	   to	   bring	   together	   British	   analytic	   philosophers	   and	  French	   philosophers,	   especially	   phenomenologists.	   The	   conference	   was	   not	  deemed	   a	   success;	   it	   only	   reinforced	   the	   division	   that	   was	   then	   opening	   up	  between	  ‘analytic’	  and	  ‘continental’	  philosophy	  –	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  both	  sides.7	  	   In	   1956	   the	   first	   book	   on	   the	   history	   of	   analytic	   philosophy	   was	  published:	  J.	  O.	  Urmson’s	  Philosophical	  Analysis:	  Its	  Development	  between	  the	  Two	  
World	   Wars.	   What	   Urmson	   understood	   as	   ‘analytic	   philosophy’	   was	   a	  combination	  of	  logical	  atomism	  (as	  elaborated	  by	  Russell	  and	  Wittgenstein	  in	  the	  1910s	  and	  early	  1920s)	  and	  logical	  positivism,	  and	  his	  book	  was	  actually	  written	  as	  its	  obituary,	  in	  clearing	  the	  ground	  for	  the	  new	  ‘ordinary	  language	  philosophy’	  that	  was	  then	  emerging	  in	  Oxford.	  The	  term	  ‘analytic	  philosophy’,	  however,	  was	  already	  being	  used	  to	   include	  ordinary	   language	  philosophy	  as	  well	  as	  the	  new	  forms	   of	   logical	   empiricism	   that	   were	   being	   developed	   at	   the	   same	   time	   in	  America,	   most	   notably,	   by	   W.	   V.	   O.	   Quine.	   By	   the	   end	   of	   the	   1960s	   analytic	  philosophy	  had	  firmly	  established	  itself	  as	  the	  leading	  philosophical	  tradition	  in	  the	  English-­‐‑speaking	  world.	  	   In	   the	   1970s	   ordinary	   language	   philosophy	   began	   to	   give	   way	   to	  philosophical	   theorizing	  based	  on	  more	   technically	   sophisticated	  philosophy	  of	  language,	   exemplified	   in	   the	   so-­‐‑called	   ‘Davidsonic	   boom’	   that	   reached	   Oxford	  from	  the	  States.	  This	  stimulated	  increased	  interest	  in	  Frege,	  seen	  as	  the	  father	  of	  semantic	  theory	  by	  Michael	  Dummett,	  in	  particular.	  Key	  here	  was	  the	  publication	  in	   1973	   of	   Dummett’s	   pioneering	   book,	   Frege:	   Philosophy	   of	   Language.	   As	   an	  interpretation	   of	   Frege,	   however,	   the	   book	   proved	   controversial.	   Dummett’s	  claim	   that	   Frege	   was	   a	   philosopher	   of	   language	   is	   now	   seen	   by	   many	   as	  anachronistic:	  Frege	  was	  primarily	  a	  mathematician,	  logician,	  and	  philosopher	  of	  mathematics	  who	  developed	   ideas	  –	  such	  as	   the	  distinction	  between	  sense	  and	  reference	   –	   that	   were	   to	   form	   the	   basis	   of	   modern	   analytic	   philosophy	   of	  language,	  but	  that	  is	  rather	  different.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 See Ryle 1962. For an account of this conference, see Overgaard 2010. I comment briefly on this, and 
the unfortunate choice of the term ‘continental philosophy’, in Beaney 2013c, pp. 49–50. 
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   Hans	  Sluga	  was	  one	  of	  the	  first	  to	  attack	  Dummett’s	  interpretation	  in	  his	  own	   book	   on	   Frege	   of	   1980,	   in	   which	   he	   argued	   that	   Frege	   needed	   to	   be	  understood	   in	   his	   German	   context,	   influenced	   by	   earlier	   philosophers	   such	   as	  Hermann	  Lotze.	  Frege:	  Logical	  Excavations,	  by	  Gordon	  Baker	  and	  Peter	  Hacker,	  published	  in	  1984,	  offered	  further	  sustained	  critique	  of	  Dummett’s	  views	  from	  a	  Wittgensteinian	   perspective.	   Analogous	   criticisms	   came	   to	   be	   made	   of	  interpretations	  of	  the	  other	  founders	  of	  analytic	  philosophy.	  Four	  books	  might	  be	  singled	  out	  here	  as	  especially	  significant:	  Gordon	  Baker’s	  Wittgenstein,	  Frege	  and	  
the	   Vienna	   Circle	   (1988),	   Thomas	  Baldwin’s	  G.	   E.	  Moore	   (1990),	   Peter	  Hylton’s	  
Russell,	  Idealism,	  and	  the	  Emergence	  of	  Analytic	  Philosophy	  (1990),	  and	  Nicholas	  Griffin’s	  Russell’s	   Idealist	   Apprenticeship	   (1991).	   All	   of	   these	   books	  were	  much	  more	  sensitive	  to	  the	  actual	  historical	  development	  of	  the	  relevant	  philosophers’	  views,	   and	   combined	   detailed	   analysis	   of	   the	   philosophical	   arguments	   with	  scholarly	  attention	  to	  issues	  of	  context	  and	  influence.	  	   By	  the	  early	  1990s,	  then,	  we	  can	  certainly	  say	  that	  an	  historical	  turn	  had	  taken	  place	  in	  analytic	  philosophy	  –	  at	  any	  rate,	  in	  some	  quarters.	  This	  historical	  turn	   coincided	  with	   increasing	   debate	   about	   the	   relationship	   between	   analytic	  philosophy	  and	  (the	  discipline	  of)	  history	  of	  philosophy,	  more	  generally;	  indeed,	  the	  two	  mutually	  reinforced	  one	  other.	  A	  collection	  of	  essays	  edited	  by	  Richard	  Rorty,	  J.	  B.	  Schneewind,	  and	  Quentin	  Skinner,	  Philosophy	  in	  History,	  published	  in	  1984,	   was	   influential	   in	   this	   regard.	   Combining	   historiographical	   essays	   with	  case	   studies,	   it	   offered	   a	   variety	   of	   views	   on	   the	   fundamental	   question	   of	   the	  relationship	  between	  ‘rational	  recontructions’	  and	  ‘historical	  reconstructions’,	  as	  Rorty	  called	  them	  –	  following	  the	  distinction	  drawn	  by	  Russell,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  in	  his	  1900	  book	  on	  Leibniz.	   Since	   then	  other	   collections	  have	  been	  published,	  most	  notably,	  Analytic	  Philosophy	  and	  History	  of	  Philosophy,	  edited	  by	  Tom	  Sorell	  and	  John	  Rogers	  (2005),	  and	  The	  Historical	  Turn	  in	  Analytic	  Philosophy,	  edited	  by	  Erich	   Reck	   (2013).	   The	   latter	   appeared	   in	   a	   series	   devoted	   to	   the	   history	   of	  analytic	   philosophy,	   the	   first	   series	   of	   its	   kind,	   which	   had	   been	   established	   in	  2007.8	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 For the books that have been published in the series, see the series website: 
http://www.palgrave.com/series/history-of-analytic-philosophy/HAP/. 
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6	  Historiographical	  debates	  in	  history	  of	  analytic	  philosophy	  Today	  history	  of	  analytic	  philosophy	   is	   recognized	  as	  a	  branch	  of	  philosophy	  –	  and	   an	   area	   of	   history	   of	   philosophy	   –	   in	   its	   own	   right.	   This	   is	   not	   to	   say	   that	  there	   is	   agreement	   as	   to	   how	   it	   is	   to	   be	   pursued,	   however.	   Historiographical	  disputes	   are	   as	   heated	   here	   as	   in	   any	   other	   area	   of	   history	   of	   philosophy.	   To	  illustrate	  this,	   I	  will	  briefly	  consider	  the	  controversy	  that	  was	  generated	  by	  the	  publication	  in	  2003	  of	  Scott	  Soames’	  two-­‐‑volume	  work,	  Philosophical	  Analysis	  in	  
the	  Twentieth	  Century.	  Billed	  as	  a	   ‘history	  of	  analytic	  philosophy’,	   it	  might	  more	  accurately	   be	   described	   as	   a	   series	   of	   rational	   reconstructions	   of	   selected	  canonical	   texts	   in	   the	   history	   of	   analytic	   philosophy.	   Among	   ‘mainstream’	  analytic	   philosophers,	   the	   work	   was	   generally	   commended	   as	   clear	   and	  insightful,	   while	   more	   ‘serious’	   historians	   of	   analytic	   philosophy	   roundly	  criticized	   it	   for	   its	   historical	   omissions	   and	   distortions	   and	   its	  methodological	  failings.	  The	  first	  criticism	  is	  illustrated	  by	  Soames’	  failure	  to	  discuss	  either	  Frege	  or	   Carnap	   in	   the	   two	   volumes;	   the	   second	   is	   illustrated	   by	   the	   lack	   of	   any	  adequate	   examination	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   analysis	   itself,	   despite	   the	   title	   of	   the	  work.9	  	   In	  2006	  there	  was	  an	  ‘Author	  meets	  Critics’	  session	  at	  the	  Pacific	  Division	  Meeting	   of	   the	   American	   Philosophical	   Association,	   and	   a	   symposium	   on	   both	  Volume	  I	  and	  Volume	  II	  of	  Soames’	  work	  was	  published	  in	  Philosophical	  Studies	  in	  2006	  and	  2007,	  respectively.	  In	  his	  replies	  to	  his	  critics,	  Soames	  distinguished	  his	   own	   “philosophically	   and	   pedagogically	   motivated”	   project	   to	   “develop	   a	  broad	  and	  useable	  picture	  of	  where	  we	  are	  now	  and	  how	  we	  got	  here”	  from	  the	  antiquarianism	   of	   “history-­‐‑for-­‐‑history’s-­‐‑sake”	   which	   focuses	   on	   “minor	   works,	  unpublished	  manuscripts,	  and	  private	  correspondence”	  (2006,	  pp.	  645,	  654–5).	  The	   contrast	   drawn	   here	   is	   a	   familiar	   one	   in	   debates	   about	   the	   relationship	  between	  analytic	  philosophy	  and	  history	  of	  philosophy.	  On	   the	  view	  Soames	   is	  peddling,	   analytic	   philosophers	   engage	   in	   ‘real’	   philosophy,	   attempting	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Cf. Beaney 2006b; 2013c, p. 55; 2013d, §5.3. Soames has since published the first volume of a new, 
projected five-volume work on the history of analytic philosophy (2014). This volume begins, more 
appropriately, with two chapters on Frege. For a critique of these chapters, however, see Beaney 2015, 
in a symposium dedicated to Soames’ new book. 
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discover	   the	   ‘truth’	   about	   the	   world,	   thought,	   language,	   and	   their	  interrelationships,	   while	   historians	   of	   philosophy	   just	   try	   to	   work	   out	   what	  previous	  philosophers	  thought.	  	   The	  contrast	  Soames	  draws	  is	  deeply	  flawed,	  not	  only	  in	  itself	  but	  also	  as	  a	  characterization	  of	  what	  good	  history	  of	  philosophy,	  and	  not	  least	  good	  history	  of	  analytic	  philosophy,	   involves.	  Historians	  of	  philosophy	   try	   to	  work	  out	  what	  previous	  philosophers	  thought	  not	  for	  its	  own	  sake	  but	  for	  the	  light	  it	  sheds	  on	  current	  problems,	  concepts,	  and	  debates.	  Looking	  at	  “minor	  works,	  unpublished	  manuscripts,	  and	  private	  correspondence”	  may	  help	  reveal	  presuppositions	  that	  are	  hidden	  in	  ‘official’	  texts.	  Exploring	  the	  broader	  context	  may	  also	  help	  uncover	  assumptions	  that	  are	  taken	  for	  granted	  by	  all	  participants	  in	  a	  particular	  debate	  at	   a	   given	   time,	   and	   which	   need	   to	   be	   brought	   out	   and	   examined	   in	   order	   to	  resolve	  or	  take	  the	  next	  step	  in	  the	  debate.	  	   This	   is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  Soames’	  own	  project	   is	  misguided	  or	  that	  rational	  reconstructions,	   in	   general,	   are	   illegitimate	   in	   history	   of	   philosophy.	   On	   the	  contrary,	  rational	  reconstructions	  are	  essential	  in	  making	  sense	  of	  the	  arguments	  and	   views	   investigated.	   But	   they	   are	   only	   part	   of	   the	   story.	   They	   need	   to	   be	  complemented	   by	   historical	   reconstructions,	   which	   help	   support,	   refine,	   and	  elaborate	   them.	   Historical	   reconstructions,	   in	   turn,	   require	   rational	  reconstructions	  to	  direct	  them:	  to	  extract	  the	  right	  information	  from	  the	  mass	  of	  historical	   data,	   the	   right	   questions	  must	   be	   asked.	   Elsewhere	   I	   have	   suggested	  that	  what	   is	  needed	   is	   ‘dialectical	  reconstruction’,	  which	  combines	  rational	  and	  historical	  reconstruction	  in	  seeking	  to	  understand	  the	  dynamic	  development	  of	  a	  philosopher’s	   thought.10	   As	   Cassirer	   stressed	   in	   criticizing	   Russell’s	   book	   on	  Leibniz,	  we	  need	  to	  be	  sensitive	  to	  the	  tensions	  that	  drive	  philosophical	  thinking,	  and	  this	  requires	  narrative	  approaches	  as	  well	  as	  argumentation.	  	  
7	  Forms	  of	  historicism	  Soames’	   attempt	   at	   a	   history	   of	   analytic	   philosophy	   is	   a	   poor	   advert	   for	   good	  analytic	  history	  of	  philosophy.	  Better	  exemplars	  have	  already	  been	  mentioned:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 See especially Beaney 1996, pp. 3ff.; 2013d, pp. 253–4. 
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Peter	  Hylton’s	   (1990)	   and	  Nicholas	  Griffin’s	   (1991)	  works	  on	  Russell,	   to	  name	  just	   two.	   There	   are	   also	   far	   more	   sophisticated	   accounts	   of	   analytic	  historiography	  of	  philosophy.	  I	  shall	  say	  something	  briefly	   in	  this	  section	  about	  Hans-­‐‑Johann	   Glock’s	   recent	   discussion	   in	   chapter	   4	   of	   What	   is	   Analytic	  
Philosophy?	   (2008).	   Although,	   in	   answering	   the	  main	   question	   of	   his	   book,	   he	  fails	   to	   do	   justice	   to	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   analytic	   philosophy	   is	   ‘analytic’	   (see	  Beaney	   2011),	   I	   am	   in	   substantial	   agreement	   with	   a	   lot	   of	   what	   he	   says.	   His	  discussion	  of	  historiography	  is	  especially	  helpful,	  although	  here,	   too,	   I	   think,	  he	  does	   insufficient	   justice	   to	   the	   historical	   nature	   of	   philosophy,	   analytic	  philosophy	  included.	  	   Chapter	  4	  is	  entitled	  ‘History	  and	  Historiography’,	  and	  Glock’s	  main	  aim	  is	  to	  show	  how	  analytic	  philosophy	  cannot	  be	  defined	  by	  any	  particular	  approach	  it	  takes	  to	  history.	  Analytic	  philosophy	  has	  often	  been	  charged	  with	  historiophobia	  and	   anachronism,	   Glock	   argues,	   but	   in	   neither	   case	   is	   this	   characteristic	   of	  analytic	   philosophy	   –	   even	   though	   they	   might	   be	   found	   in	   the	   work	   of	   some	  analytic	   philosophers.	   There	   is	   no	   reason	   for	   analytic	   philosophers	   to	   reject	  historicism,	   which	   Glock	   defines	   as	   “any	   position	   that	   promotes	   historical	  thinking	  in	  philosophy	  and	  warns	  against	  ignoring	  or	  distorting	  the	  past”	  (p.	  89).	  But	  we	  need	   to	  distinguish	   three	   forms	  of	   ‘historicism’,	  Glock	   argues,	   of	  which	  only	   the	   third	   should	   be	   endorsed,	   the	   first	   being	   misguided	   and	   the	   second	  unproven.	   The	   first	   is	   ‘intrinsic	   historicism’,	   according	   to	   which	   philosophy	   is	  intrinsically	   historical;	   the	   second	   is	   ‘instrumental	   historicism’,	   according	   to	  which	   study	   of	   the	   past	   is	   an	   indispensable	  means	   to	   philosophizing;	   and	   the	  third	  is	  ‘weak	  historicism’,	  according	  to	  which	  study	  of	  the	  past	  is	  merely	  useful	  in	  philosophizing	  (p.	  90).	  	   Few	   philosophers	   would	   deny	   weak	   historicism,	   though	   Glock	   reports	  Wittgenstein’s	   remark	   that	   “I	   see	   that	  whenever	   I	   read	  a	  philosophical	  book:	   it	  doesn’t	  improve	  my	  thoughts	  at	  all,	   it	  makes	  them	  worse”	  (p.	  92).	  Instrumental	  historicism,	   as	   Glock	   formulates	   it,	   permits	   a	   variety	   of	   interpretations,	  depending	  on	  what	  precisely	  is	  meant	  by	  ‘study	  of	  the	  past’	  and	  ‘philosophizing’.	  We	  can	  give	  it	  a	  reading	  on	  which	  it	  palpably	  comes	  out	  false.	  If	  by	  ‘study	  of	  the	  past’	   we	   mean	   seriously	   reading	   at	   least	   one	   philosophical	   text,	   and	   if	   by	  ‘philosophizing’	  we	  mean	   asking	   at	   least	   one	   question	   generally	   recognized	   as	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philosophical	   (such	  as	   ‘How	  do	   I	  know	  anyone	  else	   sees	   the	  world	  as	   I	  do?’	  or	  ‘Does	  God	  exist’)	  and	  offering	  some	  kind	  of	  answer	  to	  it,	  however	  half-­‐‑baked	  or	  confused,	  then	  instrumental	  historicism	  is	  false.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  if	  by	  ‘study	  of	  the	  past’	  we	  mean	   learning	  or	   reading	   something	  of	  what	   someone	   in	   the	  past	  thought,	   and	   ‘philosophizing’	   means	   expressing	   one’s	   thinking	   in	   appropriate	  philosophical	   language,	   then	   instrumental	   historicism	   would	   seem	   to	   be	   true,	  since	  we	   can	   only	   learn	   this	   language	   from	   others.	  Wittgenstein	   had	   certainly	  studied	  the	  works	  of	  Frege	  and	  Russell	  very	  carefully,	  and	  if	  he	  was	  later	  able	  to	  float	  free,	  it	  was	  because	  he	  had	  taken	  on	  board	  a	  lot	  of	  problems	  as	  intellectual	  ballast.	  Moreover,	   there	   is	   good	   and	   bad	   philosophizing,	   and	   few	  philosophers	  would	  claim	  that	  no	  study	  of	  the	  past	  at	  all	  is	  needed	  to	  do	  good	  philosophy.	  	   Glock	   does	   not	   provide	   any	   direct	   arguments	   against	   instrumental	  historicism;	  he	  just	  criticizes	  attempts	  to	  defend	  it.	  He	  does,	  however,	  appeal	  to	  the	  neo-­‐‑Kantian	  distinction	  between	  genesis	  and	  validity,	  and	  notes	  the	  ‘genetic	  fallacy’:	   “the	   mistake	   of	   deducing	   claims	   about	   the	   validity	   of	   a	   theory	   or	   the	  content	  of	  a	  concept	  from	  information	  about	  its	  historical	  origins”	  (p.	  101).	  Glock	  recognizes	  that	  certain	  concepts	  are	  genetic,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  apply	  only	  to	  things	  of	  a	  certain	  origin.	  He	  gives	  as	  examples	  the	  concepts	  of	  a	  sunburn	  and	  of	  lava,	   and	   suggests	   that	   the	   concept	   of	   analytic	  philosophy	   itself	  may	  be	   such	   a	  concept.	   Nevertheless,	   he	   writes,	   “it	   is	   the	   status	   quo	   alone	   which	   determines	  whether	  a	  given	  concept	  is	  genetic	  or	  whether	  the	  actual	  or	  optimal	  justification	  of	  a	  belief	  or	  practice	  mentions	  its	  origin”	  (p.	  102).	  So	  while	  some	  concepts	  may	  require	  study	  of	  the	  past	  in	  justifying	  their	  application,	  on	  Glock’s	  view,	  there	  is	  no	  general	  reason	  why	  philosophizing	  requires	  this	  in	  every	  case	  (ibid.).	  It	  seems	  to	  me,	  however,	  that	  it	   is	  not	  the	  genetic	  character	  of	  a	  concept	  that	  determines	  whether	  ‘study	  of	  the	  past’	  is	  required.	  The	  real	  issue	  is	  whether	  the	  concept	  is	  contested	  or	  not.	  If	  there	  is	  disagreement	  about	  what,	  for	  example,	  ‘analyticity’	   or	   ‘necessity’	   means,	   then	   we	   need	   to	   know	   what	   previous	  philosophers	  have	  thought	  in	  order	  to	  resolve	  the	  disagreement	  and/or	  establish	  our	  own	  view.	  Of	  course,	  we	  can	   just	  stipulate	  what	  we	  mean	  by	  a	   term;	  but	   if	  others	  misunderstand	   or	   challenge	   it,	   then	  we	   need	   to	   explain	  what	   is	   wrong	  with	  other	  views	  to	  justify	  our	  own,	  and	  this	  will	  require	  some	  kind	  of	  study	  of	  those	  views.	  We	  need	  only	  return	  to	  Frege	  for	  an	  obvious	  example	  (despite	  his	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own	   official	   anti-­‐‑historicism).	   Frege	   gave	   a	   definition	   of	   ‘analytic’	   in	   his	  
Grundlagen	   that	  differs	   from	  Kant’s.11	  He	   said	  he	  did	  not	   intend	   to	   introduce	  a	  new	   sense,	   “but	   only	   to	   capture	   what	   earlier	   writers,	   in	   particular	  Kant,	   have	  meant”	  (1884,	  §3).	  He	  nevertheless	  criticizes	  Kant’s	  own	  definition	  in	  defending	  this	  claim	  (see	  e.g.	  1884,	  §88);	  and	  although	  Frege	  was	  no	  Kant	  scholar,	  it	  would	  be	  perverse	  to	  say	  that	  he	  had	  made	  no	  study	  of	  Kant.	  Many	  of	  the	  concepts	  that	  philosophers	   seek	   to	   analyse	   and	   understand	   are	   of	   this	   kind	   –	   perhaps	   all	   of	  them.	   The	   contestability	   of	   concepts	   surely	   lies	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   what	   drives	  philosophizing.	   No	   account	   of	   one’s	   own	   views	   could	   be	   satisfactory	   without	  some	   clarification	   of	   how	   they	   differ	   from	   other	   views.	   The	   ‘historical	  elucidation’	  that	  I	  suggested	  in	  §2	  played	  an	  important	  role	  in	  Frege’s	  writing	  is	  no	  less	  present	  in	  the	  work	  of	  other	  philosophers.	  Some	  kind	  of	  study	  of	  the	  past	  is	  thus	  indeed	  indispensable.	  Is	   philosophy	   intrinsically	   historical?	   Again,	   this	   can	   be	   understood	   in	  various	   ways.	   But	   if	   the	   claim	   just	   made	   about	   the	   essential	   contestability	   of	  philosophical	   concepts	   is	   right,12	   then	   there	   is	   one	   sense	   in	  which	   it	   is.	   This	   is	  what	   Glock	   calls	   the	   ‘hermeneutic	   variant	   of	   intrinsic	   historicism’	   (p.	   95),	  originating	   with	   Hans-­‐‑Georg	   Gadamer	   and	   endorsed	   by	   both	   Rorty	   and,	   more	  recently,	   Robert	   Brandom,	   a	   philosopher	   who	   –	   significantly	   –	   is	   still	   firmly	  rooted	  in	  the	  analytic	  tradition.13	  Philosophy,	  on	  this	  view,	  is	  a	  conversation	  with	  tradition.	   As	   we	   have	   seen,	   even	   a	   philosopher	   as	   officially	   anti-­‐‑historicist	   as	  Frege	  engaged	  in	  dialogue	  with	  some	  of	  his	  great	  predecessors,	  and	  this	  is	  no	  less	  true	   of	   analytic	   philosophers	   today,	   however	   much	   they	   might	   like	   to	   parade	  their	   rejection	   of	   historicism.	   Perhaps	   they	   only	   concern	   themselves	   with	   the	  work	   of	   other	   philosophers	   in	   the	   immediate	   past	   –	   responding	   to	   the	   latest	  article	  in	  Mind	  or	  Analysis,	  for	  example;	  but	  this	  still	  involves	  making	  some	  ‘study	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 According to Kant’s official criterion, a true judgement of the form ‘A is B’ is analytic iff the 
predicate B is contained in the subject A. See e.g. Kant 1781/1787, A6–7/B10–11. As Frege defines it, 
a truth is analytic if its proof depends only on general logical laws and definitions (1884, §3). 
12 The idea of ‘essentially contested concepts’ was introduced by Gallie (1956); see also Gallie 1964, 
ch. 8. Many philosophical concepts are ‘essentially contested’ in Gallie’s sense, I think, although this 
might itself be contested. But the important point here, as Gallie himself puts it, is that “the adequate 
understanding of such concepts involves some appreciation of their history” (1964, p. 189). 
13 See especially Gadamer 1960; Rorty 1980, ch. 8; Brandom 2002, ch. 1. 
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of	   the	   past’.	   So	   I	   find	   no	   grounds	   for	   endorsing	   only	   a	   weak	   historicism:	  philosophy	  has	  an	  historical	  dimension	  in	  a	  far	  stronger	  sense.	  	  
8	  Danto	  and	  analytic	  philosophy	  of	  history	  In	   1965	   Arthur	   Danto	   (1924–2013)	   published	   his	   Analytical	   Philosophy	   of	  
History,	  which	  might	  be	  seen	  as	  marking	  the	  high-­‐‑point	  of	  analytic	  philosophy	  of	  history.	  Its	  origins	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  1942,	  when	  Carl	  Hempel	  published	  ‘The	  Function	  of	  General	  Laws	  in	  History’,	  in	  which	  he	  sought	  to	  extend	  the	  ‘covering-­‐‑law’	   model	   of	   explanation	   to	   the	   case	   of	   history.	   On	   this	   model,	   an	   event	   is	  explained	  when	  a	  general	  law	  is	  specified	  under	  which	  the	  event	  falls.	  Objections	  to	   Hempel’s	   view	   centred	   on	   the	   alleged	   differences	   between	   scientific	   and	  historical	   explanation.	   Influenced	   by	   Collingwood,	   philosophers	   such	   as	   W.	   H.	  Walsh,	   William	   Dray	   and	   W.	   B.	   Gallie	   argued	   for	   a	   more	   narrative	   approach,	  emphasizing	  the	  motives	  and	  reasons	  for	  actions	  of	  the	  agents	  involved.14	  Rooted	  more	   in	   the	   analytic	   tradition,	   Morton	   White	   also	   argued	   for	   a	   narrative	  approach.15	   In	   this	   context,	   Danto’s	   book	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   attempting	   to	   bring	  narratives	   under	   the	   covering-­‐‑law	  model,	  while	   resisting	   the	   intentionalism	   of	  Collingwood.	  	   In	  ‘The	  Decline	  and	  Fall	  of	  the	  Analytical	  Philosophy	  of	  History’,	  published	  in	  1995,	  however,	  Danto	  argued	  that	  Hempel’s	  views	  soon	  became	  outdated	  once	  Kuhn’s	   paradigm-­‐‑changing	   book,	   The	   Structure	   of	   Scientific	   Revolutions,	   had	  appeared	  in	  1962.	  This	  altered	  the	  whole	  nature	  of	  the	  debate	  about	  history	  and	  historiography,	   leaving	   Danto’s	   book	   somewhat	   stranded	   on	   the	   beach	   of	   a	  superseded	  paradigm.	  It	  is	  true	  that	  Danto’s	  book	  did	  not	  consolidate	  a	  new	  field	  of	  analytic	  philosophy	  of	  history	  in	  anything	  like	  the	  way	  that	  analytic	  aesthetics	  or	   analytic	   political	   philosophy	   became	   established	   in	   the	   1960s.16	   But	   Danto	  does	   not	   do	   justice	   to	   his	   own	   work	   in	   this	   later	   assessment.	   The	   fact	   that	  
Analytical	   Philosophy	   of	   History	   was	   republished	   in	   1985,	   as	   part	   of	  Narration	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 See especially Walsh 1951; Dray 1957, 1964; Gallie 1964. 
15 See e.g. White 1963, which opens the collection edited by Hook 1963, in which there are other 
essays discussing White’s views. White’s essay was revised and expanded into ch. 6 of White 1965. 
16 See Lamarque 2013 and Wolff 2013 for an account of the development of analytic aesthetics and 
analytic political philosophy, respectively. 
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and	  Knowledge,	  with	  three	  additional	  chapters,	  testifies	  to	  its	  influence	  well	  after	  the	  1960s.	  But	  the	  new	  title	  is	  significant.	  What	  his	  1965	  book	  helped	  inaugurate	  –	  through	  his	  central	  idea	  of	  a	  ‘narrative	  sentence’	  –	  was	  the	  narrative	  turn	  that	  took	  place	  in	  philosophy	  of	  history,	  literary	  theory,	  and	  philosophy	  of	  literature.	  It	  was	  this	  rather	  than	  the	  ‘analytic’	  attempt	  to	  bring	  history	  under	  the	  covering-­‐‑law	  model	  of	  explanation	  that	  was	  later	  seen	  as	  significant.17	  	   In	   his	   introduction	   to	   a	   collection	   of	   essays	   on	   The	   Revolution	   in	  
Philosophy	   published	   in	   1956,	   Gilbert	  Ryle	   remarked	   that	   “History	   begins	   only	  when	  memory’s	  dust	  has	  settled”	  (p.	  1),	  and	  it	  is	  often	  suggested	  that	  fifty	  years	  needs	  to	  elapse	  before	  we	  can	  begin	  to	  understand	  the	  past.	  It	  is	  now	  fifty	  years	  since	   the	   publication	   of	   Danto’s	   book,	   so	   what	   can	   we	   now	   make	   of	   it?	   In	  particular,	   how	  do	   things	   look	   after	   the	   historical	   turn	   in	   analytic	   philosophy?	  Danto	  did	  not	  contribute	   in	  any	  direct	  way	  to	   this	  historical	   turn;	  but	  his	   ideas	  have	  obvious	  application	  to	  what	  we	  have	  already	  said.	  	   The	   idea	   that	   has	   the	  most	   obvious	   application	   is	   the	   “general	   insight”	  that	  Danto	  expresses	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  his	  book:	  “events	  are	  continually	  being	  re-­‐‑described,	  and	  their	  significance	  re-­‐‑evaluated	  in	  the	  light	  of	  later	  information.	  And	  because	  they	  have	  this	  information,	  historians	  can	  say	  things	  that	  witnesses	  and	   contemporaries	   could	   not	   justifiably	   have	   said.”	   (2007	   [1965],	   p.	   11)	   The	  first	   ‘history’	   of	   analytic	   philosophy,	   by	   J.	   O.	   Urmson	   (mentioned	   above),	   was	  indeed	   only	   written	   some	   fifty	   years	   after	   the	   perceived	   origins	   of	   analytic	  philosophy,	   and	   the	   originators	   themselves	   could	   clearly	   not	   have	   anticipated	  the	  effect	  that	  they	  had.	  Nor	  could	  they	  have	  claimed	  to	  have	  inaugurated	  a	  new	  philosophical	   tradition,	   as	   it	   took	   at	   least	   thirty	   years	   for	   this	   to	   begin	   to	   be	  established	  in	  a	  recognizable	  way.	  	   In	  the	  very	  next	  paragraph	  Danto	  goes	  on:	  “To	  ask	  for	  the	  significance	  of	  an	   event,	   in	   the	  historical	   sense	  of	   the	   term,	   is	   to	   ask	   a	  question	  which	   can	  be	  answered	   only	   in	   the	   context	   of	   a	   story”	   (ibid.).	   We	   might	   call	   this	   Danto’s	  ‘context	   principle’,	   thereby	   locating	   it	   in	   a	   story	   that	  we	   could	   tell	   that	   begins	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 We have a good example here of one of Danto’s own central claims – that the significance of an 
event can only be judged in the light of later information. On the reception of Danto’s book, see 
Ankersmit 2007. As Ankersmit argues, as a philosophy of history, the book had more influence in 
Germany, especially through the work of Hans Michael Baumgartner. 
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with	  the	  context	  principle	  that	  Frege	  formulated	  in	  his	  Foundations	  of	  Arithmetic:	  “The	  meaning	  of	  a	  word	  must	  be	  asked	  for	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  proposition,	  not	  in	  isolation”	   (1884,	   p.	   X/1997,	   p.	   90).	   If	   the	   linguistic	   turn	   might	   be	   seen	   as	  originating	  in	  Frege’s	  context	  principle,	  then	  the	  narrative	  turn	  might	  be	  seen	  as	  having	  a	  source	  in	  Danto’s	  context	  principle,	  the	  story	  we	  tell	  about	  both	  of	  these,	  as	  well	  as	  their	  interconnection,	  itself	  illustrating	  Danto’s	  principle.	  Telling	  such	  a	   story	   would	   also	   be	   a	   way	   of	   explaining	   how	   Danto’s	   philosophy	   of	   history	  counts	   as	   ‘analytic’:	   it	   has	   its	   place	   in	   a	   broader	   story	   about	   analytic	  philosophy.18	  	   At	  the	  end	  of	  his	  first	  chapter	  on	  ‘Substantive	  and	  Analytical	  Philosophy’	  (from	  which	  we	  have	  just	  quoted),	  Danto	  states	  that	  one	  of	  the	  main	  purposes	  of	  analytical	  philosophy	  of	  history	  is	  to	  clarify	  the	  ‘mode	  of	  co-­‐‑ordination’	  of	  events	  that	  characterises	  history	  (i.e.,	  history-­‐‑writing).	  We	  have	  to	  wait	  until	  chapter	  8,	  the	   key	   chapter	   of	   the	   book	   on	   ‘Narrative	   Sentences’,	   however,	   for	   this	  clarification	   to	   be	   provided.	   The	   most	   general	   characteristic	   of	   narrative	  sentences,	  Danto	  writes,	  is	  that	  “they	  refer	  to	  at	  least	  two	  time-­‐‑separated	  events	  though	  they	  only	  describe	  (are	  only	  about)	  the	  earliest	  event	  to	  which	  they	  refer”	  (2007	  [1965],	  p.	  143).	  To	   take	  one	  of	  Danto’s	  own	  examples,	   ‘The	  Thirty	  Years	  War	  began	  in	  1618’	  refers	  to	  two	  events,	  the	  beginning	  and	  end	  of	  the	  war,	  but	  is	  only	   about	   the	   first	   (ibid.,	   p.	   152).	   Furthermore,	   the	   description	   of	   the	   earlier	  event,	   ‘the	   beginning	   of	   the	  Thirty	  Years	  War’	   is	   not	   one	   that	   could	  have	  been	  used	  prior	  to	  the	  occurrence	  of	  the	  second	  event.	  In	  narrative	  sentences,	  two	  (or	  more)	   events	   are	   co-­‐‑ordinated,	   but	   in	   such	   a	  way	   that	   the	   earlier	   can	   only	   be	  described	  in	  the	  way	  it	  is	  from	  a	  perspective	  informed	  by	  knowledge	  of	  the	  later.	  	   Narrative	   sentences	   are	   the	   linguistic	   vehicles	   that	   instantiate	   Danto’s	  general	   insight	   and	   context	  principle:	   events	   are	   continually	   re-­‐‑described	   from	  later	  perspectives,	  revealing	  their	  significance	  through	  the	  stories	  that	  are	  told.	  Furthermore,	   by	   being	   re-­‐‑described,	   they	   can	   be	   subsumed	   under	   appropriate	  general	   laws:	   this	   is	   how	   Danto	   sought	   to	   bring	   narratives	   under	   Hempel’s	  covering-­‐‑law	  model	  of	  explanation.	  There	  is	  no	  limit	  to	  such	  re-­‐‑descriptions	  and	  possible	   explanations,	   each	   of	   which	  may	   further	   enrich	   our	   knowledge	   of	   an	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 For one such account, see Vann 1995. 
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event.	   The	   past	   is	   open,	   then,	   to	   the	   future	   –	   to	   the	   narratives	   that	   historians	  construct.	  	   As	  mentioned	  above,	  Danto’s	  book	  was	  republished	  in	  1985	  as	  Narration	  
and	  Knowledge	  with	  three	  additional	  chapters.	  In	  the	  second	  of	  these,	  ‘Historical	  Language	   and	  Historical	   Reality’,	   Danto	   argues	   that	   just	   as	   the	   past	   is	   open	   to	  future	  descriptions,	  so	  is	  the	  present	  open	  to	  descriptions	  of	  the	  past.	  We	  make	  sense	   of	   the	   present	   by	   telling	   stories	   that	   relate	   us	   to	   the	   past.	   These	   stories	  reflect	   beliefs	   about	   the	   past,	   and	   these	   beliefs,	   Danto	   writes,	   “penetrate	   the	  language	  we	  use	  even	  to	  describe	  objects	  contemporary	  with	  those	  descriptions”	  (2007	  [1985],	  p.	  336).	  In	  our	  own	  stories	  we	  take	  these	  beliefs	  to	  be	  true,	  but	  as	  soon	  as	  those	  beliefs	  are	  questioned,	  then	  we	  have	  to	  revisit	  the	  past	  to	  resecure	  our	  present.	  As	  Danto	  concludes	  the	  chapter,	  “The	  present	  is	  clear	  just	  when	  the	  relevant	  past	  is	  known”	  (ibid.,	  p.	  341).	  	  
9	  Applying	  Danto’s	  ideas	  With	  this	  briefest	  of	  sketches	  of	  Danto’s	  analytic	  philosophy	  of	  history	  in	  mind,	  let	  us	  re-­‐‑describe	  some	  of	   the	  key	  points	  made	  earlier	   in	   this	  paper.	  We	  began	  with	   Frege’s	   use	   of	   ‘elucidation’,	  which	   I	   suggested	  must	   be	   seen	   as	   having	   an	  historical	   dimension.	   In	   order	   to	   make	   his	   own	   ideas	   clear	   (‘present’	   as	   they	  were	  then),	  Frege	  accepted	  that	  he	  needed	  to	  place	  them	  in	  an	  historical	  story,	  showing	  how	  they	  improved	  on	  the	  corresponding	  ideas	  of	  earlier	  philosophers.	  Furthermore,	   in	   stressing	   that	   it	   may	   take	   hundreds	   of	   years	   to	   achieve	  “knowledge	  of	  a	  concept	   in	   its	  purity”,	  he	  can	  be	  taken	  to	  have	  recognized	  that	  the	  past	  is	  open	  to	  future	  descriptions.	  	   The	  general	  insight	  which	  Danto	  expressed	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  his	  book	  is	  central	   to	   the	   justification	   for	   rational	   reconstruction,	   upon	   which	   analytic	  philosophers	  from	  Russell	  onwards	  have	  placed	  such	  emphasis.	  The	  significance	  of	  philosophical	  ideas	  can	  indeed	  only	  be	  appreciated	  and	  evaluated	  in	  the	  light	  of	   later	   information,	   and	   those	   ideas	  may	   need	   to	   be	   rationally	   reconstructed	  into	  some	  kind	  of	  system	  –	  drawing	  on	  conceptual	  resources	  not	  available	  at	  the	  time	  –	  for	  assessment	  to	  properly	  take	  place.	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   However,	   the	  same	  can	  be	  said	  of	   ‘historical	   reconstruction’,	   as	   that	  has	  typically	  been	  understood	   in	   contrast	   to	   rational	   reconstruction.	  Attempting	   to	  understand	   a	   philosopher’s	   view	   in	   historical	   context	   may	   also	   require	  knowledge	   that	  would	   not	   have	   been	   available	   at	   the	   time.	   So	  Danto’s	   general	  insight	   does	   not	   give	   more	   support	   to	   rational	   as	   opposed	   to	   historical	  reconstruction.	  Genetic	  narratives	  as	  well	  as	   justificatory	  accounts	  may	  equally	  need	  the	  benefit	  of	  hindsight.	  	   It	   should	   also	   be	   clear	   that	   the	   ground	   for	   Danto’s	   narrative	   turn	   was	  prepared	  by	  the	  earlier	  linguistic	  turn	  that	  Wittgenstein	  effected	  (with	  roots,	  too,	  in	  the	  work	  of	  Frege	  and	  Russell).	  Danto’s	  book	  is	  full	  of	  the	  attention	  to	  language	  that	  characterizes	  analytic	  philosophy	  after	  the	  linguistic	  turn,	  and	  could	  well	  be	  described	   as	   offering	   a	   critique	   of	   historical	   language.	   Danto	   criticizes	  ‘substantive’	  or	  ‘speculative’	  philosophy	  of	  history	  and	  seeks	  to	  diagnose	  certain	  confusions	  about	   the	   ‘logic’	  of	  historical	  discourse.19	   	  We	  might	  also	  redescribe	  Wittgenstein’s	  later	  talk	  of	  inventing	  ‘fictitious	  natural	  history’,	  to	  loosen	  the	  grip	  that	   certain	   concepts	   may	   have	   on	   us,	   as	   constructing	   narratives	   about	  alternative	  forms	  of	  life,	  in	  which	  different	  concepts	  developed.	  	   We	   have	   already	   noted	   how	   analytic	   philosophy	   only	   began	   to	   be	  recognized	   as	   the	   tradition	   we	   know	   it	   today	   at	   least	   thirty	   years	   after	   its	  supposed	   origins,	   confirming	  Danto’s	   view	   that	   judgements	   of	   significance	   can	  only	  be	  made	  with	  sufficient	  historical	  distance.	   It	   is	  also	  not	   surprising	   that	   it	  then	  took	  at	  least	  another	  30	  years	  for	  the	  historical	  turn	  in	  analytic	  philosophy	  to	  occur.	  There	  needed	  to	  be	  a	  number	  of	  narratives	  on	  the	  table	  for	  questions	  to	  arise	  as	  to	  their	  legimitacy,	  and	  for	  historical	  reconstructions	  to	  kick	  in	  to	  correct	  rational	   reconstructions.	   We	   can	   now	   see,	   for	   example,	   that	   Dummett’s	   1973	  interpretation	   of	   Frege	   as	   a	   philosopher	   of	   language	  was	   a	   child	   of	   its	   times	   –	  when	   semantic	   theorizing	   took	   off	   in	   Oxford	   in	   the	   1970s.	   Once	   the	  presuppositions	  of	   semantic	   theory	   itself	  were	  questioned	  and	   investigated,	   so	  too	  were	  its	  supposed	  origins	  in	  the	  work	  of	  Frege.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 This is perhaps clearest in the ‘redescription’ of his project that Danto provided in the additional 
chapter on ‘Historical Language and Historical Reality’ in Narration and Knowledge. 
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   Finally,	   we	   might	   note	   that	   Danto’s	   views	   give	   support	   to	   the	  ‘hermeneutic	   variant	   of	   intrinsic	   historicism’	   mentioned	   at	   the	   end	   of	   §7.	   If	  philosophy	   is	   a	   ‘conversation	   with	   tradition’,	   then	   reassessing	   the	   past	   in	   the	  light	  of	  later	  information	  is	  something	  that	  goes	  on	  all	  the	  time	  in	  philosophizing.	  Furthermore,	  to	  talk	  of	  essentially	  contested	  concepts	  is	  to	  talk	  of	  concepts	  that	  are	  revisited,	  reconstructed	  and	  redefined	  over	  and	  over	  again	  in	  the	  history	  of	  philosophy.	   Indeed,	   one	   might	   be	   tempted	   to	   characterize	   them	   as	   ‘narrative	  concepts’,	   concepts	   that	  are	  central	   to	  stories	   that	  are	   told	  about	   the	  history	  of	  philosophy	   and	   that	   we	   need	   to	   elucidate	   in	   locating	   our	   own	   projects	   in	   the	  historical	  space	  of	  philosophy.	  We	  cannot	  fully	  explain	  our	  key	  concepts	  (such	  as	  those	  of	   logic	  or	  analyticity)	  without	  referring	  to	  the	  related	  concepts	  that	  past	  philosophers	  had.	  Modifying	  Danto’s	  characterization	  of	  narrative	  sentences,	  we	  might	  say	  that	  narrative	  concepts	  refer	  to	  at	   least	  two	  time-­‐‑separated	  concepts	  though	   they	   only	   denote	   one	   of	   the	   concepts	   to	   which	   they	   refer	   –	   the	   latest	  concept	  if	  we	  are	  using	  it	  to	  expound	  our	  present	  views,	  and	  an	  earlier	  one	  if	  we	  are	  discussing	  the	  views	  of	  a	  past	  philosopher.	  Even	  when	  we	  are	  philosophizing	  ourselves	   (in	   the	   present),	   then,	   there	  will	   always	   be	   implicit	   reference	   to	   the	  concepts	  of	  the	  past.	  	  
10	  Conclusion:	  reinvigorating	  analytic	  philosophy	  of	  history	  We	   have	   seen	   how	   Danto’s	   ideas	   can	   be	   applied	   in	   redescribing	   some	   of	   the	  points	  made	   in	  earlier	  sections	  of	   this	  paper.	  They	  also	  apply	  to	  his	  own	  work:	  we	   can	   now	   redescribe	   his	   book	   as	   helping	   inaugurate	   the	   narrative	   turn,	   for	  example.	  But	  fifty	  years	  on,	  what	  significance	  might	  be	  accorded	  to	  his	  ‘analytic’	  philosophy	  of	  history?	  	   In	  his	  preface	  to	  Analytical	  Philosophy	  of	  History	  Danto	  describes	  analysis	  in	  general	  as	  yielding	  “a	  descriptive	  metaphysic	  when	  systematically	  executed”.	  His	   own	   book,	   he	   goes	   on,	   “is	   an	   analysis	   of	   historical	   thought	   and	   language,	  presented	   as	   a	   systematic	   network	   of	   arguments	   and	   clarifications,	   the	  conclusions	  of	  which	  compose	  a	  descriptive	  metaphysic	  of	  historical	  existence”.	  (2007	   [1965],	   p.	   xv)	   Some	   analytic	   philosophers	   might	   prefer	   ‘revisionary’	   to	  ‘descriptive’	  metaphysics,	   to	  use	  the	  distinction	  made	  famous	  by	  P.	  F.	  Strawson	  
	   Historiography,	  Philosophy	  of	  History	  and	  the	  Historical	  Turn	  in	  Analytic	  Philosophy	   24	  
The	  final	  publication	  is	  available	  at:	  www.brill.com/journal-­‐‑philosophy-­‐‑history	  
(1959),	   and	   some	   might	   repudiate	   metaphysics	   altogether,	   but	   many	   analytic	  philosophers	  would	  have	  little	  objection	  to	  what	  Danto	  says	  here.	  Described	  like	  this,	  there	  seems	  an	  important	  role	  for	  analytic	  philosophy	  of	  history	  to	  play.	  	   In	   the	   first	   chapter	   Danto	   spells	   out	   his	   conception	   in	   more	   detail.	  Analytical	  philosophy	  of	  history,	  he	  writes,	  is	  “philosophy	  applied	  to	  the	  special	  conceptual	  problems	  which	  arise	  out	  of	  the	  practice	  of	  history	  as	  well	  as	  out	  of	  substantive	   philosophy	   of	   history”	   (2007	   [1965],	   p.	   1).	   He	   then	   criticizes	  substantive	   philosophy	   of	   history	   for	   doing	  more	   than	   giving	   accounts	   of	   past	  events:	  it	  also	  tries,	  illegitimately,	  to	  offer	  accounts	  of	  the	  whole	  of	  history,	  which	  includes	   making	   prophecies	   about	   the	   future	   (ibid.,	   pp.	   1,	   9).	   Analytical	  philosophy,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  as	  noted	  in	  §8	  above,	  restricts	  itself	  to	  clarifying	  the	   ‘mode	  of	   co-­‐‑ordination’	   of	   events	   (ibid.,	   p.	   15).	   Since	  our	  knowledge	  of	   the	  past	  is	  limited	  by	  our	  ignorance	  of	  the	  future,	  according	  to	  Danto,	  identifying	  this	  limit	  is	  the	  “special	  business”	  of	  analytical	  philosophy	  of	  history	  (ibid.,	  p.	  16).	  	   Danto	  says	  no	  more	  about	  what	  analytical	  philosophy	  of	  history	  is	  in	  the	  rest	   of	   the	   book.	   But	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   narrative	   sentences	   are	   central	   to	   his	  conception.	  For	   if	  what	  they	   involve	   is	  reference	  to	  at	   least	  two	  time-­‐‑separated	  events	  while	  only	  describing	  the	  earlier	  one,	  then	  there	  is	  a	  complexity	  here	  that	  requires	  analysis	  to	  elucidate.	  This	  is	  just	  what	  Danto’s	  book	  seeks	  to	  provide,	  in	  the	  ‘systematic	  network	  of	  arguments	  and	  clarifications’	  of	  which	  he	  spoke	  in	  his	  preface.	  So	  it	  is	  entirely	  appropriate	  to	  characterize	  his	  philosophy	  of	  history	  as	  ‘analytical’.	  But	  if	  this	  is	  so,	  then	  there	  is	  a	  genuine	  field	  of	  analytic	  philosophy	  of	  history	  that	  does	  not	  deserve	  to	  have	  been	  occluded	  when	  the	  narrative	  turn	  was	  taken,	   and	  which	   is	   also	   independent	   of	   the	   (problematic)	   approach	   taken	   by	  Hempel.	  	   Returning	   to	   analytic	   philosophy	   today,	   then,	   and	   to	   historiographical	  debates	   after	   the	  historical	   turn,	   in	  particular,	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   there	   is	   a	  host	  of	  issues	   for	   an	   analytic	   philosophy	   of	   history	   to	   address.	   Some	   have	   been	  illustrated	   in	   the	   present	   paper,	   most	   notably,	   concerning	   Frege’s	   use	   of	  historical	   elucidation,	   conceptions	  of	   rational	  and	  historical	   reconstruction	  and	  their	   relationship,	   and	   different	   forms	   of	   historicism.	   In	   general,	   if	   philosophy	  has	   a	   more	   historical	   dimension	   than	   analytic	   philosophers	   have	   traditionally	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recognized,	  and	  Danto	  is	  right	  that	  “The	  present	  is	  clear	   just	  when	  the	  relevant	  past	   is	  known”	  (ibid.,	  p.	  341),	   then	  there	   is	  much	  work	  to	  be	  done	   in	  exploring	  the	  logical	  connections	  between	  past	  and	  present	  concepts,	  sentences	  and	  whole	  discourses	   (including	   narratives	   themselves).	   The	   historical	   turn	   in	   analytic	  philosophy,	   then,	  opens	  up	  the	  possibility	  of	  reinvigorating	  analytic	  philosophy	  of	  history	  and	  deepening	  understanding	  of	  philosophical	  historiography.20	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